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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER RULE-A FELON'S
GUILT FOR DEATHS CAUSED By OTHERS-
THE RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Within the past decade the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rendered
four decisions on the issue of a felon's criminal responsibility for a homicide
directly caused by someone other than himself or a co-conspirator during
the commission of a robbery,' and another decision on the issue of a
felon's criminal responsibility for the "accidental suicide" of a co-felon
during the commission of an arson.2 The purpose of this Comment will
be to examine these decisions, compare them with relevant decisions from
other jurisdictions, and analyze them in the light of principles of causation.
Before a discussion of the doctrine of causation under the felony-murder
rule can be properly delivered, it will be necessary to treat homicide and
the felony-murder rule in general. It is not within scope of this Com-
ment to discuss the conspiracy rules, except incidentally.
I.
HOMICIDE AND THE FELONY-MURDER RULE.
Homicide is the killing of a human being by the act, omission, or
procurement of another human being. It is classically separated into
three categories: (1) justifiable homicide, (2) excusable homicide, and
(3) felonious homicide. A homicide is justifiable when authorized by
law. It is excusable when committed in self-defense or by pure accident.
Any homicide perpetrated without justification or excuse is unlawful, and
is either murder or manslaughter. Murder is any unlawful homicide
committed with "malice aforethought" while manslaughter is any unlaw-
ful homicide committed under the stress of provocation and without "malice
aforethought." 8 "Malice aforethought" consists, of any of the following
states of mind:
1. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472' (1958) ; Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa.596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
2. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958).
3. Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950); Commonwealth
v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868); 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *176-199; 1 WARREN,
HOMIciDE § 54 (Supp. 1954).
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(1) An intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person;
(2) An intent to do an act knowing that it will probably cause death
or grievous bodily harm to a human being, accompanied by a
willful indifference toward the risk involved;
(3) An intent to commit any dangerous felony whatever;
(4) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in arresting
or keeping in custody a person whom he has a right to arrest
or keep in custody.
4
When a homicide occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony,
usually considered to be limited to arson, burglary, robbery, rape and
kidnapping, the malicious intent to commit the original offense is trans-
ferred to the felon's act which caused the homicide in order to make it
murder regardless of the felon's actual intent in doing the act which caused
the homicide.5 This, generally, is the so-called felony-murder rule.6
II.
STATUTES RELEVANT TO THE FELONY-MURDER RULE.
Before a detailed analysis of the felony-murder rule and causation
in Pennsylvania is entered upon, it will be better to clarify the relevance
of any pertinent statutes at this point. The only pertinent statute in
Pennsylvania provides:
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or
by lying in wait or by any other kind of wilful, premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping shall be
deemed murder in the first degree, and all other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree. . . ." 7
A careful reading of this statute shows that it defines neither murder, nor
felony-murder, but rather it merely provides that certain types of murder,
and certain types of felony-murder shall be punishable in the first degree,
4. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934).
5. People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931) ; Commonwealth v.
Stelma, 327 Pa. 317, 192 AtI. 196 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Aston, 227 Pa. 106,
75 Atl. 1017 (1910); 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *200-201.
6. "The rule of common law was that where death occurred by act of one who
was in pursuit of an unlawful design, without any intention to kill, it would be either
murder or manslaughter, according to whether the intended offense was a felony or
only a misdemeanor." 1 WARREN, HOMICIDE § 74 (Supp. 1954).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1957). See Keedy, History of Penn-
sylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 759 (1949). PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4919 (Supp. 1957) provides that where the wanton derailment
of a railroad train results in a death, the perpetrator of the derailment is guilty of
first degree murder.
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while all other kinds of murder are punishable in the second degree.8
For a definition of murder, and felony-murder, one must resort to the
common law in Pennsylvania.9 Before any homicide committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any of the enumerated felonies
can be punishable in the first degree under this statute, it must first be
murder under the common law.1 However, this is not entirely true because
the words arson, rape, and burglary, as used in the statute, are to be given
their broadened statutory meaning when determining whether a felony-
murder has been committed which is punishable in the first degree."1 But
the common law principles of felony-murder are nevertheless retained as the
criteria for determining culpability, and so it becomes necessary to explore
these fundamentals.
III.
THE FELONY-MURDER RULE IN GENERAL.
As has been said, the felony-murder rule imputes malice into whatever
the felon does while perpetrating a dangerous felony. 12  This is analogous
to the doctrine of transferred intent. Under that doctrine where A shoots at
B with an unlawful intent to kill him, but misses and kills C, A's malicious
intent to kill B is transferred to his act of killing C, thus making it murder.'
3
So also, if a homicide is "accidentally and unintentionally" caused by a
felon during the perpetration of an arson,' 4 rape,1 burglary,'
6 or robbery,"'
it is nevertheless murder, the requisite malice being supplied by the felon's
original intent to commit a dangerous felony.' 8 Of course, if a homicide
8. For a statutory definition of murder and felony-murder see N.Y. PEN. LAWS
§ 1044 (McKinn. Supp. 1957) ; Arent and MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine
and Its Application Under the New York Statute, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 288 (1935).
9. "Murder in this Commonwealth, though divided by statute into degrees, is
still determined by common law." Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 298, 74
A.2d 125, 129 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947);
Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 Atl. 968 (1914).
10. Commonwealth v. Elliot, 349 Pa. 488, 37 A.2d 582 (1944); Commonwealth
v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941).
11. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 175 Atl. 518 (1935) ("arson" means
arson as defined by common law and in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4905 (Supp. 1957)) ;
Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338 (1955) ("rape" means rape as
defined by common law and includes "statutory" rape as defined in PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4721 (Supp. 1957)), changing the rule of Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa.
155, 89 Atl. 968 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Maloney, 365 Pa. 1, 73 A.2d 707 (1950)
("burglary" means burglary as broadly defined by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4901
(Supp. 1957)).
12. See note 5 supra.
13. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 283 Pa. 327, 129 Atl. 86 (1925) ; Commonwealth v.
Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 28 At. 824 (1894) ; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201.
14. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 175 AtI. 518 (1935).
15. Commonwealth v. Prenni, 357 Pa. 572, 55 A.2d 532 (1947).
16. Commonwealth v. Elliot, 349 Pa. 488, 37 A.2d 582 (1944) ; Commonwealth v.
Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941).
17. Commonwealth v. Pepperman, 353 Pa. 373, 45 A.2d 35 (1947) ; Commonwealth
v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922).
18. See note 5 supra.
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is "intentionally" caused during the perpetration of a felony, there would
usually be no need for the prosecution to rely on the felony-murder rule. 9
There are only two areas which give rise to problems in applying the
felony-murder rule. The first involves situations where it is difficult to
determine whether spatially and temporally the homicide occurred during
the commission and in the perpetration of a felony.20 In Pennsylvania, once
the felon's acts reach the stage of an attempt to commit a felony, the
requisite malice will be supplied to any killing by the felon to constitute
murder; 21 and if a killing occurs while fleeing from the scene of a com-
pleted burglary, 22 or after a robbery is consummated but is "referable" to
the robbery it is also murder.2 In Commonwealth v. Doris,24 the defendant
was held responsible for the death of a police officer caused by a co-felon
while fleeing from a robbery, even though it occurred after the defendant
had been apprehended.
The other area which provokes difficulty in applying the felony-murder
rule involves the issue of causation. The genesis of this problem lies in
the loose way the felony-murder rule has been repeatedly defined. 25  Such
phrases as "during the commission of" and "in the perpetration of" cannot
be used to impute responsibility to the felon for every homicide occurring
during such time. 26  There must be a causal connection between the acts
of the felon, or one acting in concert with him, and the death if he is to be
held criminally responsible.27 The problem of causation under the felony-
murder rule arises chiefly when the felon is sought to be charged for a death
19. See Commonwealth v. LeGrand, 336 Pa. 511, 9 A.2d 896 (1939); Common-
wealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Ati. 374 (1899).
20. See Cadmus, The Beginmng and End of Attempts and Felonies Under the
Statutory Felony Murder Doctrine, 51 DICK. L. REv. 12 (1946).
21. Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 154 Atl. 283 (1931). The attempt must
be actual and not constructive. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 1 Grant 484 (Pa. 1858).
22. Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375, 150 Atl. 649 (1930).
23. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 282 Pa. 128, 127 Atl. 465 (1925).
24. 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926) (there was no voluntary removal from the
conspiracy for a time sufficient to exculpate defendant from guilt for his co-felons'
acts). But see, Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 284, 4 A.2d 805, 806 (1939)
(held, on facts showing defendant accidentally shot police officer after he was
arrested, that the trial court charge that "no accidental killing can possibly follow
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate a robbery, or the acts connected with it,"
was reversible error for being "too broad" in that it would permit the jury to convict
defendant for a homicide occurring long after the robbery was over).
25. E.g., "If an involuntary killing happens in the commission of an unlawful act
which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, the
offense is murder:" 1 WARREN, HomicmE § 74 (Supp. 1954).
26. ". . . [T]he act which results in death must be done in furtherance of the
felony. Mere coincidence of time between the homicide and the felony should not
suffice to make it felony murder, if the act resulting in death was wholly disconnected
from the commission of the underlying felony." Corcoran, Felony Murder in New
York, The Causal Relation, 6 FoRDHAm L. REv. 43, 67 (1937).
. 27. "In order for a homicide which is committed in the perpetration of or
attempted perpetration of any of the enumerated felonies, to be adjudged murder of
the first degree, there must be 'no break in the chain of events' and the homicidal act
must be 'connected' with the initial maliciously motivated offense." Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 287, 4 A.2d 805, 808 (1939). See Crum, Causal Relations and
the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191.
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directly caused by the act of another.28 A brief chronological survey of the
relevant cases will afford the best method of obtaining an understanding of
the development of the law on this issue (causation) in Pennsylvania.
IV.
CAUSATION AND THE FELONY-MURDER RULE.
As early as 1844, in Commonwealth v. Hare,2 9 a case involving the
homicide of an innocent bystander who was killed by a bullet fired from
one of two groups of men engaged in an unlawful affray, the trial judge
charged the jury that in determining the guilt of the defendant, who was
a member of one of the groups engaged in the affray, it mattered not from
which quarter the fatal bullet was fired. Subsequent cases in other juris-
dictions indicate a contrary view,80 and in Commonwealth v. Mellor,3 1 and
Commonwealth v. Thompson,3 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
affirming convictions, tacitly approved the trial judges' charges which
would have entitled the respective defendants to an acquittal if the jury
had found that the victim of the robbery perpetrated by the defendant was
killed by a bullet fired by someone attempting to suppress the robbery.
This contention has been expressly approved in several other jurisdictions
where the issue has been unequivocally raised.3 3 But there is a line of cases
outside Pennsylvania, known as the "shield cases," which hold that when
felons force an innocent bystander to go from a place of safety to a place of
danger and use him as a shield to ward off the bullets of anyone attempting
to resist the felons, they will be guilty of murder for his homicide if he is
accidentally killed by those resisting the felons.3 4 A "shield case" has
28. Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DICK. L.
Rav. 3 (1948) ; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 50 (1956) ; Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q.
453 (1955). When the felon's own act directly causes the death there is no problem,
even if the death is accidental. See notes 14-17 supra.
29. 4 PA. L.J. 257, 259, 2 Clark 467, 470 (Quar. Sess. Phila. 1844) (stating: "If
the law should be called upon to detect the particular agents by whom such a slaying
has been perpetrated in a general combat of this kind, it would perpetually defeatjustice and give immunity to guilt.").30. Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Camp-
bell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863) (a rioter cannot be held guilty of murder or
manslaughter for the homicide of an innocent bystander who is killed by a bullet
fired by one who is lawfully engaged in suppressing the riot).
31. 294 Pa. 339, 144 Atl. 534 (1928) (evidence held sufficient to sustain finding
that defendant fired the fatal shot).
32. 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936) (evidence held sufficient to sustain finding
that defendant fired the fatal shot).
33. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) (robbers not
guilty of murder where victim of robbery accidentally kills a bystander) ; State v.
Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568(1924) (felons cannot actually or constructively be imputed with responsibility for
the acts of one engaged in repelling the felonious assault).
34. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934) ; Hinrichs v. First Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 71 Nev. 168, 283 P.2d 614 (1955) ; Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621,57 S.W. 1125 (1900) ; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900). See
People v. Wilburn, 314 P.2d 590 (Cal. App. 1957), aff'd, 321 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1958).
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never arisen in Pennsylvania. However, in Commonwealth v. Moyer 35 the
Supreme Court, in upholding defendants conviction for murder, stated that
it was immaterial whether the bullet which killed an innocent bystander
was fired by the victim of the attempted robbery or by one of the defendant-
robbers. This statement has been severely criticized as mere dicta and not
to be followed.36  Nevertheless it was relied upon in Commonwealth v.
Almeida,3 7 a case which squarely presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court the issue of a felon's responsibility for death possibly caused by
another. In that case an off-duty policeman was shot and killed by an
unidentified bullet during a gun battle between felons fleeing from the
scene of a robbery and pursuing policemen. The trial judge charged the
jury that the defendant could be convicted even if the fatal bullet was not
fired by any of the felons, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on the verdict, holding
that "whether the fatal shot was fired by one of the bandits or by one of
the policemen who were performing their duty in repelling the bandit's
assault . . . is immaterial," because the proximate cause of the by-
stander's death was the felonious acts of the felons in perpetrating a robbery
and engaging in a gun battle with police.3 8  Two cases which followed
shortly after the Almeida case recognized its validity in dicta. 9 Then,
35. 357 Pa. 181, 189, 53 A.2d 736, 741 (1947) stating: "A man or men engaged
in the commission of such a felony as robbery can be convicted of murder in the first
.degree if the bullet which causes death [to an innocent bystander] was fired not by
the felons but by the intended victim in repelling the aggressions of the felon or felons."
In agreement is People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) (held robbers
guilty of murder for the death of the victim of the robbery which was accidentally
caused by the victim's brother in attempting to repel the felons).
36. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 659, 117 A.2d 204, 213 (1955) (dissenting opinion) ;
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 639, 68 A.2d 595, 616 (1949) (dissenting
opinion). The reason for this criticism is well founded because the Moyer case was
appealed from a verdict of guilty, based on a trial judge's charge that the defendants
would not be guilty of murder if the deceased was accidentally killed by the victim
of the intended robbery; hence it may be inferred that the jury believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the bullet which killed the deceased came from a gun fired by
one of the defendants, and there was more than sufficient evidence to uphold this finding
on appeal, thus making it unnecessary to discuss the possibility of the fatal bullet's
having been fired by the victim of the intended robbery. Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 187, 53 A.2d 736, 740 (1947). See also People v. Wilburn, 314 P.2d
590 (Cal. App. 1957), aff'd, 321 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1958). Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d
876 (Fla. 1955) (held evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that the defendant-
felon fired the fatal shot, but opinion stated dicta that he would be held responsible
even if a policeman fired the fatal shot. Cf. People v. Giro, 197 N.Y. 152, 158, 90
N.E. 432, 434 (1916).
37. 66 Pa. D & C 351 (0. & T. Phila. 1948), af'd, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595(1949) (Justice Jones dissenting), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
38. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 610, 68 A.2d 595, 602, 603 (1949).
See 98 U. PA. L. REv. 431 (1950) ; 23 TEMP L.Q. 423 (1950). People v. Podolski,
332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (19'52) (held that the trialjudge correctly charged the jury that if the fatal shot had been fired by an officer,
such fact would not preclude the jury from finding the defendant guilty of murder).
Contra, see notes 30, 33 supra.
39. Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953) ; Commonwealth
v. Phillips, 372 Pa. 223, 93 A.2d 455 (1953). See People v. Wilburn, 314 P.2d 590
(Cal. App. 1957), aft'd, 321 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1958) ; Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 1955).
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interjected into this line of robbery cases, came the first Commonwealth v.
Bolish case, 40 an arson case, wherein the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of the defendant for trial errors in admitting certain evidence, but
stated in dicta, which became the holding of the second Bolish case, 41 that
an arsonist is guilty of murder when his co-arsonist accidentally kills himself
while setting fire to the building intended to be destroyed. Not long after
the first Bolish case came the highly controversial case of Commonwealth
v. Thomas,42 which extended the felony-murder rule to its broadest com-
prehension. In that case the victim of a robbery shot and killed one of the
robbers as they fled from the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court held
that the surviving robber may be convicted of murder under these circum-
stances, because "the robbery was the proximate cause of the death.
[There is] no sound reason for distinction merely because the one killed was
a co-felon." 43 However that distinction was considered to be of paramount
importance in the recent decision of Commonwealth v. Redline,44 which
expressly overruled the Thomas case while distinguishing the Almeida and
Moyer cases on the basis of the party killed,'since they were indistinguish-
able on the basis of who did the killing. In Redline, the defendant and his
accomplice, after leaving the scene of a robbery, engaged in a gun battle
with police wherein the accomplice was shot and killed by police bullets.
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction of murder because
the homicide of his co-felon by police bullets was justifiable homicide, and
while the felony-murder rule imputes malice into whatever the felon does,
it cannot be extended to embrace the acts of another engaged in repelling the
felony when they achieve their intended purpose. 45  On the same day that
40. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
41. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958). See notes 46,
48 infra.
42. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955) (Justices Jones, Chidsey and Musmanno
dissenting). The decision is reviewed, according to the author's count, with approvalin thirteen law periodicals and with disapproval in fourteen others. See, e.g., 44GEo. L.J. 529 (1956); 29 TEMP. L.Q. 205 (1956); 1 VILL. L. REv. 351 (1956).
43. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 645, 117 A.2d 204, 206 (1955).Justices Jones, Chidsey and Musmanno dissented because the homicide of a felon by
the victim of the felony is justifiable homicide. Contra, People v. Garippo, 292 Ill.293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920) (defendants would not be guilty of murder for the death of
their co-felon if he was killed by one repelling the robbers) ; Commonwealth v. Moore,121 Ky. 97, 100, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905) (dictum); People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y.
255, 260-262, 172 N.E. 489, 491-492 (1930) (dictum); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C.
658, 662, 122 S.E. 568, 570 (1924) (dictum).
44. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (Justice Bell dissenting; Justice Cohen con-
curred specially, and would have expressly overruled the Almeida and Bolish cases).
45. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (Justice Belldissented because he felt that it did n6t matter who fired the fatal shot or who waskilled as long as the homicide was a "natural result" of the felony). See People v.
Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97,100, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass.(7 Allen) 541, 545-546 (1863) (dictum) ; People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 260-262,172 N.E. 489, 490-491 (1930) (dictum) ; State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 662, 122S.E. 568, 570 (1924) (dictum) ; accord, see cases note 30 supra. But see People v.Payne, 359 Il. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) ; People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52
N.W.2d 201 (1952).
[VOL. 3: p. 518
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the Redline case was decided the Supreme Court also decided the second
case of Commonwealth v. Bolish.46 In reaffirming the dicta of the first
Bolish case 47 that an arsonist is guilty of murder when his co-arsonist
accidentally kills himself while starting the fire, the court reasoned that
the fact that the deceased was ". . . an accomplice to the felony did not
alter the situation, since his own act which caused his death was in further-
ance of the felony." 48 Cases from other jurisdictions on the issue of an
arsonist's criminal responsibility for the accidental suicide of his co-felon are
both contrary to 49 and in accord with 50 the Bolish case. Since under the
general rules of conspiracy law the acts of one conspirator in furtherance
of the common objective are imputed to his co-conspirators,5 1 it could, with
logic, be said that, when one conspirator accidentally kills 'himself while
doing an act in furtherance of the common design, his co-conspirators have
killed him. Analogous to this type of situation are cases involving the
criminal responsibility of a felon when one of his co-felons actually does,
either accidentally or intentionally, kill another co-felon during the com-
mission of a felony. There are no cases on this point in Pennsylvania.
New York has held that when one of several escaping prisoners accidentally
shoots and kills one of his co-conspirators, all who unlawfully participated
in the attempted prison escape are guilty of murder,52 while Illinois has a
46. 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958) (Justices Musmanno and Cohen dissenting).Bolish and Flynn conspired to burn a house for insurance. Circumstantial evidence
placed Bolish outside the house while Flynn was inside starting the fire. Flynn was
severely burned and died several hours later. Bolish's conviction of first degree
murder for Flynn's death was affirmed.
47. See note 40 supra.
48. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, 449 (1958). Justices
Musmanno and Cohen dissented because they felt that since the co-felon accidentally
killed himself, it was a suicide therefore, for some purposes, not a homicide; and
consequently the defendant cannot be convicted of murder because murder requires
a homicide.
49. People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928). the deceased voluntarily
aided the defendant's co-conspirator to start the fire, which resulted in his death,
without the knowledge or consent of the defendant; order granting defendant's motion
for new trial affirmed. People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177, 181, 287 N.Y. Supp. 257,
262 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (held the killing of Gagliano occurred by his own act, and
therefore was not by the act of another, and so his death does not come within the
definition of criminal homicide).
50. State v. Morran, 306 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1957). The facts'of this case are
exactly as in People v. Ferlin, supra note 49; nevertheless the defendant's conviction
was upheld.
See, in a parallel situation, State v. Leonard, 110 Conn. 55, 147 Atl. 118 (1929)(arsonist held guilty of murder where deceased voluntarily entered burning building
to save property). Compare Regina v. Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287, 176 Eng. Rep. 129(Nisi Prius 1862), with State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932) (fireman
killed, arsonist held guilty).
51. Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953) ; Commonwealth
v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926); Commonwealth v. Robb, 284 Pa. 99,130 Atl. 302 (1925) ("lookout" is equally responsible) ; Commonwealth v. Major,
198 Pa. 290, 47 Atl. 741 (1901).
52. People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930) (prison escape is a
felony in New York).
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decision to the contrary.3 More striking, however, is a California decision
which held all the conspirators to a robbery guilty of murder when one
member of the group intentionally shot and killed another out of anger
during the commission of the felony.5 4
With this background of what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
other jurisdictions have held when determining the criminal responsibility
of a felon for a death caused by another during the perpetration of a felony,
it will now be easier to analyze the reasons and policies underlying the
decisions and give an evaluation of them.
V.
CONCLUSION.
Those older courts, outside of Pennsylvania, which refused to hold a
felon criminally responsible for a homicide directly caused by the act of
another acting adverse to the felon during the perpetration of a felony
did so because:
1. there was no consent by the felon to accept the responsibility for
those acts and therefore they could not be even constructively imputed to
the felon;
2. such acts cannot be said to be in furtherance of the felon's original
criminal design, but rather are expressly opposed to it; it cannot be said.
that the felon has ratified them.55 The so-called "shield cases" are dis-
tinguishable because in those cases the felon's own affirmative act of forcing
an innocent bystander to act as his shield can be said to be the direct cause
of the innocent bystander's death from a bullet fired by another engaged
in repelling the felons."6  Commonwealth v. Moyer, 7 and Commonwealth
v. Almeida,5s relied heavily on the proximate cause doctrine of tort cases
53. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920). The leader of a band
of robbers was shot and killed during a gun battle with someone engaged in repelling
the robbery; held, if one of his co-felons accidentally shot him, none of the felons
are guilty of murder because there was no common design among them to kill their
leader. Query, should the doctrine of transferred intent apply? See text at note 13
supra. Cf. note 43 supra.
54. People v. Cabaltero, 203 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939). Contra,.Rex
v. Plummer, Kel. 109, 12 Mod. 627, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B. 1701) (the defendant
cannot be found guilty of murder when one of his co-conspirators intentionally kills
another member of the group, because such killing is not in furtherance of the com-
mon design).
55. "In order that one may be guilty of homicide, the act must be done by him
actually or constructively, and that cannot be, unless the crime be committed by his
own hand, or by the hands of someone acting in concert with him, in furtherance of
a common object or purpose." Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 100, 88 S.W.
1085, 1086 (1905). See notes 30, 33 supra.
56. See note 34 supra.
57. 357 Pa. 181, 198, 53 A.2d 736, 745 (1947), "In the law of torts, the individual
who unlawfully sets in motion a chain of events which in the natural order of things
results in damages to another is held to be responsible for it, . . . [citing three civil
cases]. There is no reason why the principle underlying the doctrine of proximate
cause as illustrated in the three .civil cases just cited should not apply to criminal
cases also." Accord, People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) ; People v.
Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
58. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
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to sustain their holding that it was immaterial whether the innocent by-
stander was shot by one of the felons or someone engaged in suppressing
the robbery. As stated in the Almeida case:
"When men engaged in a scheme of robbery arm themselves with
loaded revolvers they show they expect to encounter forcible opposition
and that to overcome it they are prepared to kill anyone who stands in
their way. If in the course of their deadly enterprise they open
deadly fire upon policemen or others and if in self defense and to
vindicate the law the fire is returned and someone is killed by a bullet
fired in exchange of shots, who can challenge the conclusion that the
proximate cause of the killing was the malicious criminal action of
the felons? No other genesis can justly be assigned to the homicide." "
Commonwealth v. Thomas 60 also relied on the doctrine of proximate
cause, regardless of the fact that the person killed was the defendant's
co-felon, in adjudging that the defendant could be tried for the homicide
caused by another. The adoption of the tort doctrine of proximate cause
has been severely criticized by some writers, particularly for the courts
apparent failure to take cognizance of the tort doctrine of supervening
cause.6 ' However, it can be said that retaliating force is not a supervening
cause because it is not only foreseeable by the felons but it is also instigated
by them.6 Some writers consider that the Moyer, Almeida, and Thomas
decisions are justifiable because of their "deterrent effect," 3 however it has
been pointed out that ". . . where it is sought to increase the deterrent
force of a punishment, it is usually accepted as wiser to strike at the harm
intended by the criminal rather than at the greater harm possible flowing
from his act which was neither intended nor desired by him." 6 In over-
ruling the Thomas case, Commonwealth v. Redline 65 considered that it
-would be pushing the use of the tort doctrine of proximate cause too far if it
imputed to the defendant criminal responsibility for the justifiable homicide
of his co-felon by the police.6 6  It would appear that "each [felon] took
59. Id. at 634, 68 A.2d at 614.
60. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). See text at note 43 supra.
61. See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 50 (1956) ; 96 U. PA. L. REV. 278 (1947); 1 VILL. L. REV. 351 (1956).
62. See Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L. Q. 453 (1955) ; 17
FODHAM L. REV. 124 (1948) ; 98 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1950).
63. 23 TEaap. L.Q. 423 (1950) ; 96 U. PA. L. REV. 278 (1947).
64. Morris, op. cit. supra note 61, at 66. I.e., if homicide during the perpetration
of a robbery is to be deterred it would be better to place a heavier penalty on the
crime of robbery itself, rather than on just those robberies which happen to result in
a homicide.
65. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (1958). ("How can anyone, no matter how
much of an outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged against him for the
consequences of the lawful conduct of another person? The mere statement of the
question carries with it its own answer.")
66. Justice Bell, dissenting, tersely argues: "Yet (legal) malice is, we reiterate,
obviously just as much present in the felons, in a so called justifiable killing which
occurs in a robbery, as it is in an accidental or unintentional killing which occurs in
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his own chance of being injured or killed by [their victim] . . .when they
made a common assault upon him." 67 But in the second Bolish case, s
the court reasoned that since the co-felon's act, which accidentally caused
his own death, was in furtherance of the felonious conspiracy, it could be
imputed to the defendant in order to convict him of murdering the co-
felon. 9
In reviewing the Almeida, Redline and Bolish cases on the issue of
a felon's criminal responsibility for a death caused by another, which are
still good law today, inconsistencies readily appear. If a robber is to be
held guilty of murder when pursuing police accidentally kill an innocent
bystander, why should not he also be guilty of murder when they kill his
co-felon? 7o On the other hand, if a robber is not guilty of murder when
ensuing police kill his co-felon, why should he be guilty of murder when
his co-felon accidentally kills himself? 71 While these decisions may be
distinguished on technical niceties nevertheless the policies underlying each
appear to be in conflict. Since cases arising under the application of the
felony-murder rule have proven productive of any number of varying fact
patterns on the issue of causation, now is the time for promulgation of a
definitive statement of the law governing these various situations. The
criminal law, above all else, must possess the quality of certainty of defini-
tion. Perhaps the legislature can provide an adequate definition of murder
as applied in felony-murder cases. In order for the legislature to do so,
however, it would be necessary for it to investigate each of the several
felonies dangerous to life individually in relation to the total possible
number of ways death may foreseeably be caused, taking into consideration
whose act caused the death, whose life was taken, and all the relevant risks
involved.
Edward G. Mekel.
a robbery. Consequently, if the killing occurred in and as a natural result of the
robbery, what does it matter who fired the fatal shot or who was killed?" Common-
wealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 498-499 (1958).
67. State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 662, 122 S.E. 568, 570 (1924).
68. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958). In the first
Bolish case it was stated: "An arsonist is bound to know the perils and natural results
of a fire which are reasonably forseeable according to common experience of mankind,
and in particular to know that an occupant of the building set on fire, an accomplice,
a fireman and the public who are likely to come to watch the fire, may die in or as
a natural proximate result of the fire." Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 519,
113 A.2d 464, 474 (1955).
69. Justices Musmano and Cohen considered the effect of the act imputed to the
defendant and resolved that since it was a suicide for which the deceased himself
could not be held criminally responsible then neither could the defendant. Common-
wealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447, 449 (1958). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Wright, 26 Pa. C.C.. 666, 11 Pa. Dist. R. 144 (Quar. Sess. Phila. 1902) (neither
suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime in Pennsylvania).
70. Compare Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949) with
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
71. Compare Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) with
Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958). Of course, the Bolish
case involves an act resulting in death performed by a co-conspirator and is therefore
technically distinguishable.
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PARENT AND CHILD-CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENTS
FOR THE TORTS OF CHILDREN-STATUTORY IMPOSITION
OF STRICT LIABILITY.
Within the last seven years twenty-one states have enacted statutes
which, in derogation of common law, impose strict liability on the parents
of unemancipated children who maliciously damage property.1 This Com-
ment is directed toward a discussion, comparison and evaluation of these
recent enactments. A brief summary of the common-law rules for recovery
against the parent of a child-tortfeasor and a short survey of how the
civil-law jurisdictions have handled parental liability will be necessary for
a better understanding of these enactments. Also, a look at some other
statutes of long standing in many common-law jurisdictions which are
analogous to these recent enactments will round out the development of the
law on civil responsibility of parents for the torts of children. But before
an adequate exposition on the law of parental responsibility can be given,
some insight into the underlying principles which have governed the growth
of the law on this subject must be related.
I.
THE PROBLEM.
Under the common law parents are not liable for the damage caused
*by their minor children on the basis of the parent-child relationship alone.
2
This rule is deduced from the maxim that "there is no liability without
-fault."3  When one's person or property is tortiously damaged by a child,
the injured party is allowed his remedy in a suit of trespass against the
child. But it is no mere truism that children are, for the most part, of
insufficient estate to satisfy judgments entered against them. Unless the
innocent victim of a child-tortfeasor can recover compensation for his
injuries from the tortfeasor's parent he must suffer the loss himself. In
addition to the fact of the financial inability of children to respond in
damages is the current abnormal increase of juvenile delinquency and
vandalism which has resulted in an untold amount of damage to thousands
of property owners.4 The several common-law theories, which we shall
1. Including the civil-law jurisdiction of Louisiana there are twenty-two states
in all having such legislation. See note 56 infra.
2. Winfrey v. Austin, 260 Ala. 439, 71 So. 2d 15 (1954) ; Skelton v. Gambrell, 80
Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694 (1950) ; Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293
N.Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't 1937); White v. Page, 105 N.E.2d 652 (Ohio App. 1950) ;
In re Weiner, 176 Pa. Super. 255, 106 A.2d 915 (1954) ; Pflugmacher v. Thomas,
34 Wash. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949).
. 3. See Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors: A Comparative Study,.
5 ALA. L. REv. 1, 24 (1952) ; Note 30 NoTRE DAME LAW. 295 (1955).
4. "By vandalism is meant the deliberate defacement, mutilation or destruction
of private or public property by a juvenile or group of juveniles not having immediate
or direct ownership in the property so abused." Clinard & Wade, Delineation of
Vandalism, 48 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 493, 494 (1958).
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subsequently consider, upon which parental liability can be based have
proven inadequate in most of these instances. Because of these factors, the
legislatures of twenty-one states have decided that in all fairness, it is
better that the parents of these young tortfeasors be required to compensate
those who are damaged, even though the parents be without fault, rather
than to let the loss fall upon the innocent victims.5
Since these statutes are in derogation of common law, it will be best
to examine what the common-law rules of parental liability are at this point.
II.
UNDER THE COMMON LAW.
As has been said, the relationship of parent and child, per se, affords
no basis for imposing liability on the parent for the torts of his child." But
in many situations the parent may be held liable on either of two general
theories.
First,.if an agency relationship can be found to exist between the parent
and child, the parent can be held liable on the theory of respondeat su-
perior.7 The courts have gone further to find an agency relationship
between a parent and child than they have in the case of a stranger and a
child. The widespread application of the fictitious "family-purpose car
doctrine" is evidence of this.8 Since the parent is only vicariously liable
in these situations, he cannot be held unless the child was at fault.9
Where the negligence of the parent himself is the proximate cause of
his child's act which results in damage to another, the parent can be held
liable on the theory of his own negligence.' 0 The classic example of this
is where the parent negligently gives, knowingly permits, or makes it
5. In its preamble, West Virginia declared as a matter of legislative finding that
. in the State of West Virginia there are now, and have been, acts of widespread
vandalism wilfully and maliciously perpetrated by children under the age of eighteen
years, . . . that this vandalism has caused untold loss and damage of property . . .
for which adequate compensation for said victims cannot be realized because of the
lack of estate or resources of such children so that judgments against them for their
tortious acts would go unsatisfied. . . ." W. VA. CODE §5482(1) (Supp. 1957).
Another legislative motive was to pressure parents into controlling their children.
See text at note 84 infra.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Johnston v. Orlando, 357 Cal. App. 2d 692, 281 P.2d 357 (1955); Hul-
sey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664 (1932) ; Steinberg v. Cauchois,
249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y. Supp. 147 (2d Dep't 1937) ; Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350,
39 A.2d 51 (1944).
8. The doctrine is that when the owner of an automobile supplies it for the general
use of his family, he shall be liable on the theory of respondeat superior for any
negligent use of it by any member of his family. Approximately fifteen states have
adopted the doctrine. See 5A BLASHFIELD, CYC. OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAC.,
§3111 (Perm. ed. Supp. 1954) for a complete discussion of the doctrine, which is not
within the scope of this Comment.
9. "If the employee has not been negligent the employer is not liable." Haliburton
v. General Hosp. Soc'y., 133 Conn. 61, 65, 48 A.2d 261, 262 (1946).
10. Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) ; Gossett v.
Van Egmond, 176 Ore. 134, 155 P.2d 304 (1945).
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possible for his child to use an instrument which is per se dangerous,"
or which, though not per se dangerous becomes dangerous in the hands of
the child,'12 and the child's use of it results in damage to others. Here the
parent's negligence is misfeasance and, as in the agency situation, it is not
on account of the family relationship alone that the parent is charged with
liability, since under either theory a stranger may be charged with lia-
bility for a child's tortious acts.13
Perhaps the only situation where the family relationship of itself
imposes a duty on the parent to act affirmatively is where the child habitually
engages in a particular type of vicious conduct which is dangerous to
others.14  Solely because of the family relationship a duty is placed on the
parent to do all he reasonably can to reform or control such a child, and
the failure to perform that duty is nonfeasance for which the parent can
be held liable. 15 Under this theory, unlike the agency theory of liability,
whether the child can be held liable to the injured party becomes irrelevant,
since the parent's liability is based on the theory of his own negligence.'
With these considerations in mind, it will now be profitable to discuss
how the civil-law jurisdictions have handled the problem of compensating
one who is injured by a minor child.
III.
UNDER THE CIVIL LAW.
The civil codes of Europe, Central and South America, Quebec,
Louisiana, Hawaii and Puerto Rico have always provided for parental
liability for the torts of children.17 This is probably because the mores of
11. See Mazzilli v. Selger, 13 N.J. 296, 99 A.2d 417 (1953); Davis v. Mack,
8 Ohio Supp. 92 (Com. Pl. 1939) ; Sullivan v. Creed, 1 Ir. R. 317 (1904). But see
Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 400, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944) (air gun held not inher-
ently dangerous).
12. See Gossett v. Van Egmond, 176 Ore. 134, 155 P.2d 304 (1945); Bride v.
Aaronson, 70 Pa. D. & C. 391 (C.P. Erie 1948) ; Note, Parental Liability for Incapable
Minor Child's Operation of Automobile, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1946).
13. See Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L. J. 886, 893-899 (1934).
14. Ibid. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 316 (1934) states, "A parent is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intention-
ally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to them . . ."
15. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (N.D. Idaho 1930) ; Gissen v. Goodwill, 80
So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955) ; Mazzilli v. Selger, 13 N.J. 296, 99 A.2d 417 (1953) ; Condel
v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944).
16. Harper and Kime, op. cit. supra note 13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 316, com-
ment c (1934) says ". . . it is not necessary that the actions of the child which he
(the parent) fails to prevent are such as to make the child himself subject to lia-
bility."
17. See Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors: A Comparative Study,
5 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1952) ; Kenyo Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern
and Civil and Common Law, 16 ILL. L. REV. 163, 268 (1922) and 17 ILL. L. REV. 187,
416 (1923).
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"family solidarity" are greater in these jurisdictions than in the common-law
jurisdictions where "individualism" has been stressed.18
The civil code of Quebec follows the French code and only raises a
presumption that the parent has been negligent when his child commits a
tort.19 The parent can avoid liability if he can show that he could not have
prevented the child from doing the act which caused the damage.2 0 The
civil codes of Hawaii and Louisiana do not provide the same defense for
the parent.21 Early Louisiana cases held the parent liable whether the
parent could or could not have prevented the damage 22 and regardless of
whether the child himself could be held liable to the injured party.3 This
seems correct in view of the fact that Article 2318 of the Louisiana code
makes the parent ". . responsible for damage occasioned by their
minor or unemancipated children . . ," but later cases have required
there to be fault somewhere in order for the parent to be held liable.2 4
In Gott v. Scott,2 it was expressly made clear that Article 2318 must be
construed in connection with Article 237 26 which only makes the parent
answerable for the torts committed by their children. Only where the
child is at fault and can be held liable to the injured party, does the parent's
liability attach automatically. 27 But, if the child was not at fault and cannot
be held liable, then there must be negligence on the part of the parent in
order to hold him liable.28 In Johnson v. Butterworth,29 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a complaint against the parents of a four-year-
old girl who bit plaintiff failed to state a cause of action because the child
was too young to have been at fault, and the complaint failed to allege that
18. "Here in its unmodified form, we find an interesting and important differencebetween the common law and the civil law. The accent of the former upon the notion
of individual responsibility might be said to illustrate the general emphasis of theEnglish common law upon the individual as seen through Renaissance and EnglishReformation thought. The civil law's preoccupation with the notion of family
solidarity, received from the Roman law, is a theme which runs throughout the codes."
Stone, op. cit. supra note 17 at 6.
19. QumEc Civ. CODE art. 1054 (1952); see PUERTo Rico LAWS tit. 31 § 5142(Supp. 1955).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. REv. LAWS HAWAII § 12262 (1945); LA. Civ. CoDE art. 237 (West Supp.1954) provides: "Fathers and mothers are answerable for the offenses or quasi-offenses
committed by their children . . ."; LA. CiV. CODE art. 2318 (West Supp. 1954) pro-
vides: "The father, or after his decease the mother, are responsible for the damage
occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children residing with them, or placed
by them under the care of other persons."
22. Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885) ; Marrioneaux v. Brugier, 35 La.
Ann. 13 (1883).
23. Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885).
24. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934); Toca v. Rojas,
152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922).
25. 199 So. 460, 464 (La. App. 1940).
26. See note 21 supra.
27. Phillips v. D'Amico, 21 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1945); Whipple v. Lirette,
11 La. App. 485, 124 So. 160 (1929) ; Victoria v. Palama, 15 Hawaii Rep. 127 (1903).
28. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934) ; Toca v. Rojas,152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922) ; Day v. Day, 8 Hawaii Rep. 715 (1891).
29. 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934).
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the parents were negligent in not warning the plaintiff of any vicious dis-
position the child might have.30 Maloney v. Goelz,31 and Rathburn V.
Kaio,3 2 are two cases which illustrate the narrow statutory construction to
which Louisiana and Hawaii have adhered. In each of these cases the
court held that although the defendant's son had breached his contract with
the plaintiff when he damaged plaintiff's car, he did not commit a tort
against the plaintiff and therefore no liability could be imposed on the
defendant.
With this background, it will be interesting to investigate just how
far statutes in common-law jurisdictions have deviated from the common
law and have borrowed civil-law methods of imposing liability on parents.
IV.
STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY IN COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS.
The statutes presently in effect in the common-law jurisdictions which
bear upon parental liability for the torts of children can be classified into
five categories:
A-Those which iterate the common law;
B-Those affecting responsibility for damage occasioned by motor
vehicles;
C-Those affecting responsibility for damage to property belong-
ing to schools;
D-Those affecting strict liability for damage to persons and
property generally; and
E--Miscellaneous types.
A.
Statutes Iterating the Common Law.
Georgia has a statute which imposes liability upon the parent if the
child is acting as the parent's agent when the tort is committed.3 3 This
has been held to be broad enough to form the basis for the "family-purpose
car doctrine" in Georgia.3 4 Connecticut and Michigan have statutes which,
upon proof that the operator of a motor vehicle is the child of the owner,
give rise to a rebuttable presumption that it was being used as a "family
30. See Day v. Day, 8 Hawaii Rep. 715 (1891) ; text at notes 14, 15 and 16 supra.
31. 12 La. App. 31, 124 So. 606 (1929) (the defendant's son rented a car from
plaintiff and promised to return it safely).
32. 23 Hawaii Rep. 541 (1916) (the defendant's son damaged plaintiff's car while
employed by plaintiff).
33. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-108 (Supp. 1957) ; see also ViRGiN ISLANDS CODE ANN.
tit. 23, § 402 (1957).
34. See Studdard v. Turner, 91 Ga. App. 318, 85 S.E.2d 537 (1954) ; Griffin v.
Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915). See note 8 supra.
COMMENTS
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol3/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [
car." 35 A recent Nevada statute goes a step further and, on proof that
the child was using his parent's car with permission, conclusively presumes
that the use was within the "family-purpose." 86
B.
Statutes Affecting Responsibility for Damage Occasioned
by Motor Vehicles.
There are three general types of motor vehicle statutes which, although
not directed primarily at parents, often result in imposition of automatic
liability on parents for the negligent or willful misuse of a motor vehicle by
their child:
1. Several states have statutes which impose strict liability on the
"owner" of a motor vehicle for the operator's negligent or willful mis-
conduct when the operator is using the automobile with the "owner's"
permission . 7  Very often a parent-owner permits his child to use his auto-
mobile and this results in strict liability being imposed on the parent. 8
2. A number of other states impose statutory liability on "any person"
who furnishes a motor vehicle to a minor, knowing him to be under a cer-
tain age, for damage occasioned by the minor's negligence.39 Here too,
liability is often imposed on a parent.4
3. A large number of states have adopted the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Operators' and Chauffeurs' Act which requires the parents of a minor under
a prescribed age, who is applying for a driver's license, to sign his applica-
tion.41 The act imputes any negligent or willful misconduct of the minor
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. §7904 (1949), Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 166 At.
759 (1933) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (Supp. 1957), Cebulak v. Lewis, 320 Mich.
710, 32 N.W.2d 21 (1948).
36. NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.440 (1957).
37. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.493 (Supp. 1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 231, §85A
(1957) ; MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1953) ; N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 59; R. I.
GEN. LAWS OF 1956 §31-31-3 (Supp. 1957).
38. See, e.g., Nehring v. Smith, 243 Iowa 225,,49 N.W.2d 83 (1952); Amann v.
Thurston, 132 Misc. 293, 231 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Edmond v. Fellon,
56 R.I. 419, 186 Atl. 151 (1938).
39. Under the age of eighteen: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-420 (West's Supp.
1957) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §6106 (Supp. 1956) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 22,§ 156 (Supp. 1957) ; under sixteen: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 57 (Supp. 1955)
KAN. REV. STAT. § 8-222 (1949) ; MO. STAT. ANN. § 302.250 (Vernon's Supp. 1954);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §211 (Supp. 1957).
40. See, e.g., Paschal v. Sharp, 215 Ala. 304, 110 So. 387 (1926) ; Shrout v. Rinker,
148 Kan. 820, 84 P.2d 974 (1938) ; Strout v. Polakewich, 139 Me. 134, 27 A.2d 911
(1942) ; Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366; 129 Atl. 88 (1925).
41. The act may be found in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 507 (1926). The act was declared obsolete
in 1943 and withdrawn. However 30 states and Hawaii have adopted the act in sub-
stantially the same form as Arkansas; see note 41 infra. States having the act are:
Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kansas, Ky., La., Md., Mich.,
Mo., Miss., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.M., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ore., R.I., Tenn., Tex.,
Utah, Va., Wash., and Wis.
[VOL. 3: p. 518
17
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
JUNE 1958]
so licensed to the person or persons who signed his application.42 A strict
construction of this act has allowed many parents to escape liability. 
4
A case in point is Richardson v. Donaldson," which held that the parent
of an unlicensed minor was not liable because the Arkansas statute imposed
liability only on those who signed the minor's application for a license, and
this parent did not sign.45 The Arkansas legislature thereafter, in an
emergency bill, amended its act 46 to provide that any parent who know-
ingly allows his minor child to drive unlicensed, or to drive with a license
obtained without his signature as required, shall nevertheless be liable for
any damage occasioned by the child's operation of a motor vehicle.
47
Since the foregoing statutes place no limit on the amount of recovery
that may be had from a parent, and since they cover both intentional and
negligent wrongs of the child against one's person as well as against his
property, they are still of value today, even in jurisdictions which have
enacted the so-called "strict liability" statutes (discussed below) because
of the various limitations included in the latter.
C.
Statutory Strict Liability for Damage to School Property.
Since school property has always been the common objective of a
vandal's destructive impulses, eleven jurisdictions early felt that it was
necessary to provide compensation for the schools by imposing liability
on the vandal's parent.48  The Arkansas and Missouri statutes 49 make it
42. Arkansas' act is typical and provides: "(a) The application of any person
under the age of 18 years for an instruction permit or operator's license shall be signed
and verified . . . by both the father and mother of the applicant, if both are living
and have custody of him.'. . . (b) Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor
under the age of 18 years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be
imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or
license .... ." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-315 (Replacement 1957).
43. See Faulkner v. Marcozzi, 37 Del. 500, 185 Atl. 471 (1936) ; Litalien v. Tut-
hill, 75 Idaho 335, 272 P.2d 311 (1954) ; Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d
138 (1947). Parents were held liable in Bispham v. Mahony, 37 Del. 285, 183 At.
315 (1936) ; Bridges v. Welzier, 23 Iowa 6, 300 N.W. 659 (1921) ; Hill v. Harris,
39 Ohio Op. 267, 87 N.E.2d 97 (1948) ; Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d
766 (1951). See Comment, Parent's Liability for Tortious Operation of Automobile
by Minor Child, 5 ARK. L. REV. 192 (1950).
44. 220 Ark. 173, 246 S.W.2d 551 (1952).
45. See Gustafson v. Rajkovich, 76 Ariz. 280, 263 P.2d 5.40, 543 (1954), where
counsel's argument that this placed a premium on a violation of the statute went un-
heeded.
46. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-342 to 342.1 (Replacement 1957).
47. In Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1955), the court held the
Maryland act could not operate extra-territorially so as to impose liability on a father
who signed his son's license application for an accident that occurred in Pennsylvania;
cf. Hickman v. Tullos, 121 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1954).
48. ARIZ. REV. STAT.. ANN. § 15-446 (West's Supp. 1957); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§41.4231-.4234 (Bobbs Merrill 1947) CAI:. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16074 (Deering
1957); FLA. REV. STAT. §233.47 (1957); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 41 §233 (1954);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6214.04 (Supp. 1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 8.150, 8.160 (Vernon's
SuDp. 1954) : MONT. REV. ConE ANN. § 75-2801 (Supp. 1957); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:14-51 (West's Supp. 1957) ; S.D. CODE tit. 15, § 15.3009 (Supp. 1957) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 336.170 (1955).
49. See note 48 supra.
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a crime to damage school property and impose fines of $100 and $16 respec-
tively which a parent must pay if the damage is done by his child. Florida's
statute -1 imposes civil liability on parents only for danmage or loss of
school text books issued to their children. The statutes of the other states
impose liability on the parent for any damage to school property, real or
personal, regardless of whether the child's acts were negligent or willful. 51
Four states 52 require a ". . . complaint of the teacher . . . ." South
Dakota in Lamro Independent Consol. School Dist. v. Cawthorne,55 ad-
hering to the doctrine that statutes in derogation of common law are to be
strictly construed, held that this requirement was meaningless unless the
legislature intended the statute to apply only to damage caused by a pupil
during school hours, and hence the parent of a pupil who did his destruction
at twelve o'clock midnight was not liable to the school district. The case
also stated in dicta that the father of a boy who was an accomplice of the
defendant's son could not possibly be held liable because his son was not a
"pupil" of the school vandalized.
In closing this section it is interesting to note that in California a
parent with a personal liability insurance policy is entitled to indemnifica-
tion from his insurer if he is imputed with liability for damage to school
property caused by his child.5 4
D.
Recent Statutes Imposing Strict Liability for Damage to Persons
and Property Generally.
In 1927 the California Court of Appeals declared in Hudson v. Von
Hamrnm,55 that suit on a Hawaiian statute 56 which imposed strict liability on
parents of a child who bit the plaintiff in Hawaii, was so absolutely in con-
flict with the law and policy of California that it could not be maintained.
Since then California and twenty other common-law jurisdictions have
joined Louisiana in imposing strict liability on parents for various torts of
their unemancipated minor children who reside with them, on the basis of
the family relationship alone.5 7  Nebraska in 1951 led this movement with
an enactment that provides:
50. See note 48 supra.
51. Typical is CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16074 (Deering 1957), which provides:
"Any pupil who willfully cuts, defaces, or otherwise injures in any way any property,
real or personal, belonging to a school district is liable to suspension or expulsion,
and the parent or guardian shall be liable for all damages so caused by the pupil."
52. Arizona, Montana, South Dakota and Oregon. See note 48 supra.
53. 73 N.W.2d 337 (S.D. 1955).
54. See Arenson v. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d
816 (1955) (the willfulness of the son's act is irrelevant because the father's liability
is imposed by law).
55. 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1827). See 13 CORN. L.Q. 266 (1928).
56. See note 21 supra.
57. The twenty-two states now imposing strict liability are: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-661 (West's Supp. 1957); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West Supp. 1957); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 3231d (Supp. 1957) ; FLA. REv. STAT. § 45.20 (1957) ; GA. CODE ANN.
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"The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for the wilful
and intentional destruction of real and personal property occasioned
by their minor or unemancipated children residing with them, or
placed by them under the care of other persons." 58
The statutes of these states cover torts against property, real, personal or
mixed.59 All require that the child's tort be intentional except Louisiana
which imposes liability for damage caused by the child's negligence.,, In
the only case thus far to reach an appellate court under one of these statutes,
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Conners v. Pantano, 1 held that since a
child of four years and seven months is too young to be culpable of an in-
tentional wrong, his parent could not be held liable for damages which
resulted when the child set fire to the plaintiff's garage. This is in accord
with the view that statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly
construed. a Only six states extend their statute to cover intentional
wrongs against the person.6
All of the states require that the child be in the custody of, or under
the control of the parent sought to be imputed with liability.
0 4  Most of
the statutes prescribe that the child be under a certain age, usually
eighteen,0 but only Texas requires that the child " . . be under the
§105-113 (1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (Supp. 1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-520
(Burn's Supp. 1957) ; LA. CIv. CODE arts. 237, 2318 (West's Supp. 1954); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §27.1408 (1), (2) (Supp. 1957); MONT. REV. CODE §61-112.1 (Supp.
1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-301 (1952); Nrv. REV. STAT. § 41.470 (1957); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §22-21-1 (Supp. 1957); N.D. LAWS (1957); H.B. No. 556; OHIo GEN.
CODE ANN. § 215.411 (Page Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (Supp. 1957);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-3 (Supp. 1957) ; S.D. LAWS (1957) S.B. No. 10; TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.1001, 37.1003 (Supp. 1957) ; Tax. Civ. STAT. Art. 5923-1 (Vernon Supp.
1957-58); W.VA. CODE §5482(2), (3) (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. ANN. §331.035
(West Supp. 1958). See Recent Legis. 43 CAL. L. REV. 874 (1955) ; Recent Legis.
55 MicH. L. REV. 1205 (1957) ; Note 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 295 (1955).
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1952).
59. "... any person . . . shall be entitled to recover damages in an appro-
priate action at law in an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars . . . from the
parents of any minor under the age of eighteen, living with the parents, who shall
maliciously or wilfully destroy property, real, personal or mixed belonging to such
. . person. . . ." FLA. REv. STAT. § 45.20 (1957). The statutes of Idaho, Ind.,
Mich., Mont., N.M., N.D., Okla., S.D., Tenn., Tex., W.Va., and Wis. are similar
to Florida's.
60. See note 57 supra. For Louisiana law see text at notes 21-32 supra.
61. 86 N.W.2d 367 (Neb. 1957).
62. See Lamro Independent Consol. School Dist. v. Cawthorne, 73 N.W.2d 337
(S.D. 1955) ; see text at note 53 supra.
63. The six are: Ariz., Conn., Ga., La., Ohio, and R.I. Typical of these is the
following: "Any act of malicious or wilful misconduct of a minor which results in
any injury to the person or property of another shall be imputed to the parents having
custody or control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages. " ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (West Supp. 1957).
64. See note 57 supra. Tennessee provides: "No recovery shall be had if the
parent or guardian of the minor shows due care and diligence in his care and super-
vision of such minor child." TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1003 (Supp. 1957) ; Ohio is
similar, see text at note 76 infra; cf. text at notes 20, 21 supra.
65. Ga. prescribes seventeen. Ariz., Cal., Conn., La., Neb., Ohio, R.I. and Wis.
prescribe "minor or unemancipated minor" generally. The others prescribe eighteen.
See note 57 supra.
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age of eighteen and over the age of ten. . " 66 All of the states except
Georgia, Louisiana and Nebraska place a limit on the amount recoverable
from the parents. 67  In view of this it is important to note that all of the
statutes provide that the remedy provided therein is in addition to and not
in lieu of existing remedies at law in favor of the injured party against the
parent. 68 The Wisconsin act makes the parent liable in the discretion of
the court ". . . in any circumstance where he or they would.not be other-
wise liable under the common law. ." 69 None of the statutes takes
away or limits the injured party's right of action against the child and some
expressly reserve it.10 Only Wisconsin seems concerned with the pos-
sibility of a double recovery when it provides that any amount recovered
from the child or parent shall be apportioned to the injured party's recovery
from the other.71 However, it is hardly likely that the other jurisdictions
will allow a double recovery since it is not the purpose of these enactments
to punish the parents, but rather to provide compensation for innocent
victims of vandalism.
72
While most of the states do not specifically provide the kind of action
that is to be brought against the parents under these statutes, it can be
inferred that the action is to be one in trespass.73 Texas and West Virginia
expressly provide it to be in trespass, 74 while Michigan and Tennessee call
for an action of assumpsit. 75
The Ohio statute 76 is peculiarly different and warrants special con-
sideration. It provides that when a court finds a child to be delinquent,
it may at the hearing require the parents to enter into a recognizance with
sufficient surety in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. If the
child is ever again found to be delinquent, the recognizance may be forfeited
to any person damaged as a result of the child's second act of delinquency,
66. TEX. Civ. STAT. Art. 5923-1 (Vernon Supp. 1957-58) ; cf. Conners v. Pantano,
86 N.W.2d 367 (Neb. 1957) where Nebraska judicially set four years seven months
as the least minimum age.
67. Conn. and R.I. ($250.) ; Cal., Fla., Idaho, Mich., Mont., N.M., Nev., N.D.,
Okla., S.D., Tenn., Tex., W. Va., and Wis. ($300.) ; Ariz., Ind., Ohio ($500.). See
note 57 supra.
68. Where there is a concurrence of remedies, it would seem to be wiser to pro-
ceed under the common-law remedy since no limitation is placed thereon.
69. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.035 (West Supp. 1958).
70. See note 57 supra. Expressly reserving the injured party's rights against the
minor are Conn., R.I. and Tex.
71. See note 57 supra. Wisconsin is the only state which provides a statute of
limitation in the act (six years).
72. See Recent Legis. 55 MIcH. L. REv. 1205 (1957).
73. See note 57 supra.
74. TEx. CIv. STAT. Art. 5923-1 (Vernon Supp. 1958) ; "The form of the action
hereunder shall be an action for a wrong in justice of peace court and in trespass on
the case in other courts of competent jurisdiction." W. VA. ConE § 5482(3) (Supp.
1957).
75. "... any person . . . shall be entitled to recover damages in an action
of assumpsit . . . from the parents of any minor . . .who shall maliciously or
wilfully destroy property .. " MICIH. STAT. ANN. §27.1408(1) (Supp. 1957);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1001 (Supp. 1957).
76. OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §2151.411 (Page Supp. 1957).
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or to the county treasury. The recognizance will not be forfeited if the
parent exercised reasonable parental authority and control over the child
and could not have inhibited his child's delinquent tendencies. While this
avoids the harshness of the "strict liability" statutes, it nevertheless ade-
quately places the burden on the parent to try to change his child's delin-
quent tendencies at the risk of forfeiture of the recognizance, and at the
same time affords compensation to those injured by minors where it can
truly be said such injury is partly the parent's fault.
Whether the parent can insure himself from liability under one of these
statutes raises an interesting question. Where the statute imputes the
"intentional act" of the child to the parent, it would seem that the parent
cannot insure himself; but where the statute only imposes the "liability
for the damage caused," 77 it would seem that the parent could insure
himself from liability. Arenson v. National Automobile Cas. Ins. Co.,
7 s
held that the insured's liability for his son's arson of a school building was
imposed by law and the willfulness of the son's act could not be imputed
to the insured so as to defeat his right to indemnification.
7 9
E.
Miscellaneous Statutes Imposing Strict Liability on Parents.
A discussion of statutory imposition of strict liability on parents would
not be complete without a word on a few miscellaneous types of statutes.
Three states which impose strict liability on the owner or keeper of a dog
for damage to person or property occasioned by it charge such liability to
the parent where the owner or keeper of the dog is his minor child.
8 0
In New Mexico where fences are of extreme importance, the parent of any
child who damages a fence or who herds animals which damage any fence
is liable for the damage so occasioned.81 New Hampshire does not impose
civil liability on a parent, but there is a statute in that jurisdiction which
can require the parent to pay any fine imposed against his child.
s2
77. Only Ariz., Cal., and Nev., impute the "intentional act" to the parent.
All the others impute only the "liability for the damage caused." See note 57
supra.
78. 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955). The statute construed was CAL. EDuc.
CODE ANN. § 16074 (Deering 1957) which only imputes "liability for damages so
caused" to a parent for his child's intentionally injuring school property. See note 51
supra for text of this statute.
79. However California's "strict liability" statute imputes the "intentional act"
of the child to the parent and it remains questionable whether a parent may insure
himself from liability under such a statute. See, Note 7 HASTINGS L.J. 98 (1955)
where the author cogently argues that the policy of the Arenson case should be
followed in any subsequent litigation where CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.1 is applicable.
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3404 (1949); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 100 § 17
(Supp. 1957) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 140 § 155 (Supp. 1957). Cf. Curran v.
Burkhardt, 310 Mass. 466,. 38 N.E.2d 622 (1941).
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§47-17-9, 47-17-10 (Supp. 1957).
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 592-A:16 (1957) ; cf. text at note 49 supra.
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V.
CONCLUSION.
Apparently the trend is in favor of imposing general liability on the
parents of irresponsible minors. 83 If the primary purpose of these recent
enactments is to provide compensation for the innocent victims of juvenile
tortfeasors and not to punish their parents, it is regretful that most of them
limit recovery for damage to property and are not extended to cover injuries
to the person. For the same reason it is also regretful that they do not
comprehend the unintentional wrongs of the child as well as the intentional.
However the purpose behind this limited scope is to induce parents to teach
their children to respect the rights and property of others, so that at least
that much of the damage which is intentionally caused may be avoided. 84
But, under most of these acts a parent cannot relieve himself of liability
by showing that he tried to discipline his child.85 Nevertheless the ad-
vantages of this type of legislation far outweigh the difficulties that may
arise in applying it.
Edward G. Mekel.
TAXATION-CLosE CORPORATIONS-INTENT AND MOTIVE IN THE
DETERMINATION OF DEBT SECURITY FOR FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PURPOSES.
The characterization of an investment in a corporation as either a
debt or equity security results in significant tax consequences to both the
holder thereof or the issuing corporation. I  Double taxation of corporate
profits may be avoided by the issuance of a debt security since corporate
profits may be paid in the form of interest deductible by the corporation
rather than in non-deductible dividend payments. The latter result is of
special importance to a one-man or closely-held corporation because the is-
suance of either type is achieved with equal facility, so that a stock-
holder financing the enterprise may, theoretically, readily obtain a tax
advantage therefrom. Problems arise, however, in determining how this
83. See Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Mar. 6, 1958, p. 4, col. 3, where it is
stated that, "Revenue Commissioner Martin E. Rotman . . . wants a law to make
parents of juvenile parking meter thieves pay for replacing the meters their
children break."
84. See Note, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 34 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 222 (1955) where it is shown in footnote 39 at p. 228 that the Michigan
statute (see note 57 supra) has aided in effectuating a reduction of vandalism.
85. Under Ohio's and Tennessee's the parent can so escape liability; see notes
64 and 76 supra.
1. See SURREY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1003-04 (rev. ed.
1955) ; Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls,
61 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1947).
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saving is to be effected in the light of the zealous desire of the taxing au-
thority to perceive the "realities" of economic situations when it is to its
advantage to do so, and the attitude of the judiciary that legal relationships
are not always for tax law purposes, that which they are for other purposes
of the law.2  Of course, seeming loopholes in a taxing statute may be
unduly exploited. Legal formalities, with which a taxpayer may have
complied, certainly do not warrant a perversion of legislative intent, thus
permitting his characterization of a given transaction to bind the hands
of the court. However, formalities should not be too lightly regarded in
the determination of tax liability, for they effect legal relationships. Should
a person have a choice of two ways in which to effect a desired business
end, one of which will work to his advantage tax-wise, it is doubtful that
his motive in obtaining the tax saving by the use of the mode calculated to
do so should prejudice him in an examination aimed at determining which
mode he employed.The criterion often advanced as the guide in deciding the nature of a
particular security is the intention of the parties who created it.3 Since
motive is a factor in the creation of intent, investigation thereof might
conceivably make easier the determination of the character of a se-
curity. 4 Likewise of moment are the objective manifestations of the parties'
intent as evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the entire trans-
action. 5 Bioth motive and objective manifestations of intent, and in par-
ticular the latter, point out that which in reality occurred between the cor-
poration and stockholder, regardless of their intent.
The purpose of this Comment is to investigate the manner in which
the courts resolve the intent of the parties where a sole-stockholder or
closely-held corporation attempts to issue a debt security to its stockholders.
We shall first investigate the factors, exclusive of motive, which have
bearing upon intent and then pursue the effect which motive has in this
regard in the light of recent cases dealing with this subject.
I.
NoN-MOTIVE FACTORS.
Where an issue partakes of the characteristics of both classic debt
and stock, a so-called "hybrid" security is created. In John Kelley Co.6
2. See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1957).
3. Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.
1949); Bemis Hardware Lumber Co. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.
N.C. 1954); Kipsborough Realty Corp., 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 932 (1951).
4. See the concluding paragraphs of this Comment for a discussion of the
effect of tax avoidance motive .in the formation of subjective intent to create a debt
security.
5. Factors relevant in this regard are, inter alia, the form of obligation adopted
by the parties, presence of a fixed maturity date, an unqualified obligation as to
principal and interest subordination to outside creditors, redemption upon maturity,
existence of voting rights, debt-equity structure, and issuance of the security pro-
rata to stockholders.
COMMENTS
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the Tax Court listed factors to be considered in determining the type
of security as follows: "The determining factors are usually listed as
the name given to the certificates, the presence or absence of maturity
date, the source of the payments, the right to enforce payment of principal
and interest, participation in management, status equal to or inferior to
that of regular corporate creditors and intent of the parties." Nomen-
clature used by the parties seems to be of little advantage to the taxpayer.
Thus, while the designation of the security as a bond or note is afforded little
weight,8 if it is designated stock, such designation is considered in-
fluential. 9  However, nomeclature is not conclusive of the issue.10  The
establishment of an unqualified obligation to be paid upon a fixed maturity
date is indicative of an indebtedness," while making the annual payment
contingent upon the existence of profits points toward a finding of capital
contribution. 1 2  The existence of'voting rights 13 and subordination of the
security to that of general creditors are characteristics of stock. 4 No
comprehensive rule has been evolved for use in determining the nature df a
hybrid security, so that in each case the question turns upon a con-
sideration of all the relevant facts. 15 This is, of course, largely due to the
great number of possible combinations of the characteristics of classic debt
and stock which may be employed in an attempt to obtain the advantages
of each.
Various other circumstances, which are peculiar to income tax law,
are considered by the courts in the determination of whether a security,
be it hybrid or classic debt, will be treated as debt for tax purposes.
These considerations are leveled mainly at piercing the formalities and
surface appearances of any given situation in order to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and are most germane in the case of the sole stock-
6. John Kelley Co., 1 T.C. 457 (1943), aff'd, John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,
326 U.S. 521 (1946).
7. Id. at 462.
8. See Greenbay and Western Ry., 3 T.C. 372 (1944); 4 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 26.10 (1942). Contra, Graves Bros., 17 T.C. 1499
(1952).
9. See Verifine Dairy Products Corp., 3 T.C. 269 (1944) ; John Wanamaker
Philadelphia, 1 T.C. 937 (1943).
10. Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 904 (10th
Cir. 1949):
11. Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 357
(6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950); United States v. South Georgia
Ry. Co., 107 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1939).
12. Crawford Drug Stores v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1955).
See Wetterau Grocer v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950).
13. See The Rappold Co., 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1008 (195Q).
14. 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.
1947) ; First Mortgage Corporation v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.1943). Subordination is not conclusive however. See Earle v. W. J. Jones &
Son, Inc., 200 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1952).
15. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Crawford Drug
Stores v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1955); Wetterau Grocer v. Com-
missioner, 179 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950).
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holder and closely-held corporation. Hence, where a debt obligation is
issued to stockholders in proportion to their respective stock holdings in
the enterprise, this fact will weigh toward a non-debt classification since it
shows an intent to permit no one stockholder to gain priority over the
others in the financing of the corporation. This factor has been
sufficient to cause a finding of equity security, 16 but is not fatal to debt
classification, 17 even where the sole stockholder makes advances.' 8 Ab-
sence of a pro rata issue of the security weighs heavily in favor of a finding
of debt.19  Where the debt security is not the result of a new investment,
as where paid-in surplus or common stock is converted into debt, this
fact has been stressed in finding that no bona fide debtor-creditor relation-
ship existedA°  However, many cases have recognized debt under such
circumstances. 21
Facts indicating that risk capital has been advanced through stock-
holder "loans" provide a basis for a determination of equity security.
Thus, a purchase of capital assets with the stockholder-creditor advances
upon the outset of the business is considered evidence of capital invest-
ment.22 Loans made by stockholders without regard to normal creditor
safeguards occurring after heavy financial reverses of the company are
treated similarly.23 A significant change in the allocation of voting power
which is a result of the issuance of new debt obligations in return for voting
stock will promote debt classification. 24 An inordinate ratio of debt to
equity security, making possible large payments of profits to stockholders
in the form of interest, results also in a' careful scrutiny of the transaction,
and when considered with other factors often causes the security to be
considered stock.
25
16. 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.
1947).
17. Earle v. W. J. Jones & Son, 200 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Wilshire &
Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949).
18. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956) (parent
and wholly owned subsidiary) ; Maloney v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1949)
Alma de B. Spreckels, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1113 (1949).
19. See Weldon D. Smith, 17 T.C. 135 (1951); B.M.C. Manufacturing Co.,
11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 376 (1952).
20. Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950)
Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd on this issue inter alia, 232 F.2d 118(2d Cir. 1956).
21. See Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956);
Lansing Community Hotel Corp., 14 T.C. 183 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d
487 (6th Cir. 1951); Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 357(6th Cir. 1950).
22. Matthiessen v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Sam Schnitzer,
13 T.C. 43 (1949).
23. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion);
Martin M. Dittmar, 23 T.C. 789 (1955).
24. Sabine Royalty Corp., 17 T.C. 1071 (1951); H. E. Fletcher Co., 10 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1025 (1951).
25. See Note, THIN CAPITALIZATION: SOME CUMNT QuESTnONs, 34 Taxes 830(1956), for an extensive discussion of the problem.
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II.
MOTIVE AS A FACTOR.
Tax avoidance motive pervades the entire field of income tax law.20
In Gregory v. Helvering,2 7 the Supreme Court held that where a corpora-
tion was organized with a transfer of assets from an existing corporation
owned wholly by the taxpayer and later liquidated solely for the purpose
of avoiding federal income tax, a reorganization had not been effected
within the meaning of § 112(i) (1) (B) of the Revenue Act of 1928. The
result was that since the reorganization was not recognized the distribution
to the taxpayer was taxable as a dividend. The Court in its opinion stated
that it was "putting aside . . the question of motive in respect of taxa-
tion . . . " 28 but went on to find no business purpose in the organiza-
tion of the corporation, and therefore, refused to recognize the transaction
"which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a
business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate
shares to the petitioner." 29 The Court admitted that a corporation had
been formed but stated that its dissolution was a transaction which was,
upon its face, outside the plain intent of the statute. This case has been
interpreted as requiring a business purpose in order that transactions be
recognized as valid for tax purposes.a0 The presence of a business purpose
does not preclude the possibility of the presence of a tax avoidance motive,
but where the former exists the problem in the Gregory case will not
arise since avoidance will not be the sole cause for the taxpayer's having
entered into the transaction. The contrary is the case, however, where no
business purpose is shown.
In earlier decisions the Tax Court did not consider a lack of business
purpose as a reason for denying debt classification of securities.31 However,
in more recent cases the court, in finding a contribution to capital, has
emphasized the lack of business purpose, and thus the dominance of a
tax avoidance motive, in the issuance of the security.3 2 In all such cases,
however, there was present one or more of the non-motive factors, men-
tioned previously, which themselves could have dictated the same result.
33
26. See Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MicH. L.
REV. 1021 (1953).
27. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
28. Id. at 469.
29. Ibid.
30. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Commissioner v. Transport
Trading Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949).
31. See Cleveland Adolph Meyer Realty Corp., 6 T. C. 741 (1946), rev'd
on other grounds, 160 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107
(1945); Annis Furs, Inc., I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1943).
32. Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956)
Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957) ; Gregg Co. of Delaware, 23 T.C. 170 (1954),
aff'd, 239 F. 2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956).
33. See note 32 supra. In the Gregg Co. case the interest was to be paid
out of earnings only and was non-cumulative; in the Gooding case there was found
subordination of the security to claims of general creditors by .non-payment at
maturity.
[VOL. 3: p. 518
27
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
JUNE 1958]
In Herbert B. Miller,34 the factor, aside from tax avoidance, was inadequate
capitalization in that liabilities of a newly-formed corporation were taken
in exchange for assets of a partnership that had been conducted by the three
incorporators who were brothers. The amount designated as capital had
a par value of $1,050.00 while liabilities to the stockholders were
$174,000.00. The Tax Court, in finding a contribution to capital, relied
upon the fact that no business purpose dictated "the gross under-
capitalization" 'although there was a purpose in incorporating, i.e., the
perpetuation of the business entity after the death of one of the brothers
who, knowing he had cancer, wished to change to the corporate form.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
3 5
after finding no inadequacy of capitalization by using market value of the
stock of the corporation,3 6 indicated that there needn't be a business
purpose for choosing debt rather than stock for financing a corporation
but qualified this by excepting a "sham or masquerade," and by finding
other non-tax motives present. The court recognized the desire of one
brother that his wife not be dependent upon dividends from the enterprise
for income after his death as a proper motive of all the stockholder-
brothers in choosing debt. The tax avoidance aspect of the case is lessened
in importance since the court found the corporation adequately capitalized.
However, the case may indicate that where a classic debt exists and "non-
motive" factors are absent, the presence of tax avoidance motive will be
negated by a showing of any purpose other than tax avoidance, since a
desire for certain annual payments has been rejected as providing a
business purpose in the choice of debt where the factor of subordination was
present. 7 In Kraft Foods Co.3 8 the parent corporation, the losses of which
could no longer be set off against the profits of its subsidiary by the use of
a consolidated return, received a $30,000.00 dividend in 6% debentures
from the subsidiary in 1934. The subsidiary deducted the interest upon
the debentures which was paid to the parent, which in effect afforded con-
solidated return treatment to the operations of the corporations. There
was a reduction of the interest rate to 4%'o in 1941. Upon maturity in 1948
the debentures were replaced by a new issue of debentures that were still
outstanding at the time of the proceeding. The Tax Court held that no
genuine debt was created so that the parent did not become a creditor.
The court stressed the tax saving motive, the lack of business purpose,
the parent-subsidiary relationship and consequent lack of arm's-length
bargaining and the absence of new investment. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the parties had accomplished
34. 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
35. In re Estate of Herbert B. Miller, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
36. Id. at 731. The market value of the stock was found to be $100,000.00
based upon the valuation placed upon the stock upon the death of Herbert
Miller.
37. Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
38. 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
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a debtor-creditor relationship, which was their obvious intent, by having
complied with the legal acts that establish a debt.39 In discussing the lack
of business purpose the court interpreted Gregory v. Helvering to hold
"that transactions, even though real, may be disregarded if they are a
sham or masquerade or if they take place between taxable entities having
no real existence. ' 40 Judge Clark dissented stressing the fact that
repayment of the loans was not made and that the consolidated return
effect was contrary to legislative intent.4 1 The securities in the Kraft case
were of the classic debt variety. There was no inadequacy of capitaliza-
tion 42 so that the parent-subsidiary relationship, lack of new investment
and lack of business purpose were the best arguments of the Commissioner.
The court in giving recognition to the legal relationships established be-
tween the corporations, despite the tax saving motive, recognized the pos-
sibility of exceptions,4 but chose to give effect to the reality of the cor-
porate personality concept in their absence. While the Supreme Court in
the Gregory case purported to recognize the right of the taxpayer to
minimize his taxes by means which the law permits, 4 4 it nevertheless did
not give effect to the legal relationships created therein and, in fact, dis-
regarded them because tax avoidance had fostered them. The mas-
querade, if there be one, appears equal in both cases.
Recently the Second Circuit again had occasion to pass upon the
subject in the case of Gilbert v. Commissioner.4 5  The taxpayers, husband
and wife, made advances of $31,400.00 and $48,650.00 respectively, to a
corporation owned equally by the husband and a third party.46 The loans
were evidenced by promissory notes and were classic debt securities.
Capital of the corporation totaled $80,000.00. The loans were payable on
demand and bore interest.- The lending extended over a period be-
ginning in 1946 and ending in 1948. No payments of principal or interest
were made prior to dissolution of the corporation upon its insolvency in
1948. The Tax Court determined that the advances by the stockholder
were contributions to risk capital and did not give rise to bona fide debts
on -the part of the corporation. However, it found that the advances of
39. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
40. Id. at 128.
41. Id. at 129 (dissenting opinion).
42. There was a claim to that effect, however, which the court resolved by using
the real value of the equity in the corporation, including surplus, in the computation
of the debt-equity ratio. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 127
(2d Cir. 1956).
43. The presence of fraud or overreaching, Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); or a top-heavy debt structure sufficient to indicate risk
capital has been advanced in the form of loans, Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497
(5th Cir. 1941).
44. 293 U.S. at 469.
45. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
46. The third party advanced $78,785.64. The total advances of the tax-
payers were $80,050.00. While the wife was not a stockholder, should her ad-
vances be considered with those of her husband, the issuance of the securities
would be very close to a pro rata issue.
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the stockholder's wife were loans and permitted their deduction as non-
business bad debts. 47 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case for further findings upon which the decision of the Tax Court was
based. However, it went on to repeat in an opinion by Judge Medina,
48
the Kraft case holding that tax avoidance motive did not, of itself, render
a transaction unmeaningful for tax purposes. It laid down the test for
the classification of the security issued as being whether the funds were
advanced with a reasonable expectation of repayment and catalogued cer-
tain of the factors to be considered in making this determination. These
are: the degree of disparity between the amount of debt and capital; an
agreement to keep loans proportionate to investment in capital; the use to
which the funds advanced are put; and whether outsiders would be
willing to make such advances-all factors which concern themselves with
the degree of risk to which the funds advanced shall be subjected. The
court also said that a finding by the courts that the taxpayer was at-
tempting to avoid tax has been used as an equivalent of a finding that the
taxpayer tried to treat as a loan advances made under such circumstances
as to be too risky to qualify for recognition as loans. The court then stated
that the motive of the taxpayer is relevant only insofar as it contributes
to the external facts of the situation. While upon first glance it may ap-
pear that Judge Medina has formulated a test which excludes motive as a
factor, upon full consideration it becomes apparent that he quite possibly
has not. The expectation of repayment to which the court directs itself is
dependent upon whether the risks of the business demand an irrevocable de-
posit of the advances to the corporation. It has been seen that an intent to
create an equity investment may be shown by the manner in which funds are
put to use, e.g., to finance the corporation from its inception with the
funds advanced. Should motive be relevant to prove this "external fact,"
i.e., whether the enterprise was to be financed by the advances in question,
it is relevant in all situations involving the choice between debt or equity
security. The reason for this is that the very difference between the two
securities is that debt is to be repaid at a fixed date whereas equity re-
mains with the business permanently. If Judge Medina meant, however,
that motive is relevant only in explaining a conclusion already arrived at,
to the effect that a particular investment could, under the circumstances,
have 'been advanced only as risk capital, he has kept within the Kraft
holding. The latter appears to be his intent.
Judge Hand in his dissent 49 formulates a test which investigates
whether the parties supposed, when making the advance, that the difference
47. Benjamin D. Gilbert, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688 (1956).
48. There were three opinions written. What appears to be the majority
was written by Judge Medina. A separate concurring opinion was written by
Judge Waterman and a dissent by judge Learned Hand.
49. Although Judge Hand apparently would also reverse, he dissented, perhaps
because of the different theory upon which his opinion advances, although he
expresses doubt as to whether his theory actually differs from that of the majority.
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in the form of investment chosen would appreciably affect their beneficial
interest in the venture, other than taxwise. This seems to be a business
purpose test or, at least, a business effect test which would subject the
advance to equity treatment unless the taxpayer could show a sufficient
business reason (or effect).
III.
CONCLUSION.
The presence of a tax avoidance motive is relevant to the determination
of whether a security will be debt or stock when issued by one-man or
closely-held corporations in the Sixth 50 and Ninth 51 Circuits as well as in
the Tax Court.52 The Second Circuit apparently does not consider it as
a factor in determining the taxpayer's intent.58
It has been said that the presence of a tax avoidance motive indi-
cates an intent to create a debt, since, especially where a classic debt is
created, the parties acted in order to gain the sought-after tax advantage
which could only be accomplished by compliance with the requirements of
the taxing statute. The argument says too much, however, because
compliance with the requirements of the statute is that which is sought
to be determined and because subjective intent must conform to reality
in order to be recognized.. It is questionable that an investigation of
motive renders any affimative aid in discovering intent to create a debt and
whether a debt was actually created.
There would appear to be no logical difficulty in extending the Gregory
doctrine to this situation even where the only imperfection in the trans-
action is the presence of tax avoidance motive. The uncertainty engen-
dered thereby, in an already evanescent body of law, appears a cogent rea-
son to reject the Gregory theory. In addition, since transactions of this
type" 8are always closely scrutinized, little seems to be gained by placing
this additional hurdle before the taxpayer who already must stride high
to avoid the objective tests of capital contribution.
Burchard V. Martin.
TAXATION-PENSION PLANS UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE-PHYSICIAN AS BENEFICIARY.
In recent years it has become apparent that the taxation of physicians,
as well as of other professional people, has resulted in one of the greatest
inequities of the federal income tax scheme. The physician, who spends
50. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
51. In re Estate of Herbert B. Miller, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
52. See note 32 supra.
53. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956). But see
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
54. Reference is to transactions between sole-stockholders, or stockholders of
closely-held corporations, and their corporations.
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many laborious years in the preparation of himself for professional
competence, foregoes a decade of earnings while doing so and at the same
time, incurs great expense for his education during that period. Upon
entering practice, however, he begins to "make up" financially for the
lean years. His earnings thereafter are high per annum, thus placing
him in a high income tax bracket resulting in a much greater tax than
he would have paid were he able to amortize these "late payments" over
the term of years in which he worked and studied in preparation for
practice. Of course, somewhat the same result obtains for the businessman
who invests in a higher education and as a result earns a higher income
in later years. However, in the latter instance, should the non-professional
become an employee of a business, from executive down to clerk, he may
take advantage of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code relating
to employee pension plans which will reduce his taxes by permitting
tax-free allocations to a pension trust.
This Comment will analyze the possibility of physicians taking ad-
vantage of the pension plan provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in
the light of related legal and ethical problems.
I.
TAXATION AND PENSION PLANS IN GENERAL.
Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 prescribes the
requirements of qualified pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans. In
Section 402 it is provided that amounts actually distributed to a beneficiary
under a qualified plan shall be taxable to him in the year so distributed.'
Contributions by an employer to such plans are deductible by the employer
in the year in which made.2 Thus, it is possible under such an arrange-
ment for an employee to defer taxation upon a certain portion of his
income until his retirement. From this follows the obvious advantage
of lowering one's tax bracket, and thus his tax rate, in the year in which
a large income is earned. The income becomes taxable at a time when
one's income and tax rate are low and when the taxpayer is in greater
need of income. There are limitations placed upon the amount of income
that may be so deferred which manifest themselves in the provisions of
Section 401 defining the qualified plan and of Section 404(a) limiting the
deductibility of contributions by the employer. However, a sizeable tax
saving may be effected.
Since the Code provides for such benefits to accrue to an "employee,"
neither the individual proprietor 3 nor partner 4 may qualify as a bene-
1. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 402(a).
2. Id. at § 404(a).
3. I.T. 3268, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 196 (Part 1).
4. I.T. 3350, 1940-1 CUM. BULL. 64.
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ficiary under a pension plan.5  Therefore, the types of organization
which may be utilized by physicians in order that they qualify as em-
ployees are limited to the corporation and association taxable as a cor-
poration.( We shall proceed to an investigation of these forms of organi-
zation as possible modes in effecting a transformation of the practicing
physician from entrepreneur into employee.
II.
THE CORPORATION AS EMPLOYER.
The formation of a corporation by the physician who practices indi-
vidually, or the formation of a corporation for group practice by two or
more physicians who now practice individually, or the incorporation of a
presently existing group practice, are instances wherein an employer-
employee relationship would arise between corporation and physician.
In each instance, control of the practice would be in the physicians as sole
stockholders and directors, although ultimate management decisions would
be made by majority vote of the board of directors.
An employee-stockholder of a corporation may participate in the
corporation's pension plan to the same extent as other employees pro-
vided the plan is not designed as a subterfuge for distribution of profits
to stockholders. 7 Therefore, should a physician incorporate his practice,
he could engage in a pension plan as an employee provided there were other
employees for whose benefit the plan operated. Otherwise, the plan
might be held to be a subterfuge for the distribution of profits. The
physician practicing in his own home with a solitary nurse in his employ
could very possibly encounter difficulty on this score.8 A group practice
in corporate form by a number of physicians who maintain a clinic, might
also possibly encounter such difficulties. However, such a practice might
involve a sufficient number of assistant non-stockholder physicians, nurses,
receptionists and secretaries to obviate the problem. The amount con-
tributed by the entity on behalf of stockholder-employees in such a plan
will also affect the decision as to whether the plan is for the exclusive
benefit of employees as such.9 It has been held, however, that a plan
5. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in § 7701 (a) (20) includes full-time life
insurance salesmen as employees but goes no further in defining employee in relation
to § 401.
6. It would be possible, of course, for a physician who is an individual proprietor
to employ other physicians in his practice and thereby afford to them the pension
plan benefits here discussed. However, such an arrangement is not presently of
moment because the problem sought to be solved is that of the physician who is now
practicing in a status other than that of employee.
7. U.S. Treas. Reg. '§ 1.401-1(b) (3) (1954) ; I.T. 4020, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 61.
8. See Rev. Rul. 55-81, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 392.
9. I.T. 3674, 1944 Cum. BULL. 315 limited the contributions that could be made
by a corporation for the benefit of employee-stockholders, each of whom owned 10%o
of the voting stock of the employer, to 30% of the contributions for all participants
under the plan. I.T. 4020, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 61, revoked this ruling leaving operative
the general test of U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1956). See text at note 7
,rupra.
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was for the exclusive benefit of the employees where over 50% of the
total contributions were made on behalf of the sole-stockholder of the
employer. 10 In order to qualify, the plan must not discriminate in contri-
butions or benefits in favor of officers, shareholders, employees whose
principal duties consist in supervising the work of other employees, or
highly compensated employees as against other employees whether within
or without the plan." However, a plan is not discriminatory merely be-
cause it is limited to salaried or clerical employees or because the contri-
butions thereto bear a uniform relationship to total compensation.1
2
III.
THE CORPORATION AS EMPLOYER.
It is an often stated general rule of law that corporations may not-
practice medicine. 13 One of the reasons cited for this position is that the
centralized management inherent in a corporation could result in control
by laymen over the relationship between physician and patient, 14 resulting
in commercial exploitation of the profession.' 5 Another is the inability
of the corporate entity to meet the character and educational requirements
necessary to comply with licensing statutes.' 6 The latter statement has
been criticized on the basis that the purpose of the statutes, to regulate the
ability of those who administer to the public, is adequately served provided
the physicians hired by the entity are licensed, so that resort to the cor-
porate fiction is unwarranted.' 7 The first reason stated appears to be a
valid objection to corporate practice, even though the same objection could
be leveled at a partnership practice, because the corporate form of organi-
zation is more susceptible of outside control due to its lack of delectus
personae. However, the "one-man" incorporated practice would not be
open to this objection, nor would, necessarily, the "incorporated partner-
ship" wherein all stockholders are physicians.' 8 Nevertheless, the courts
have been practically uniform in rejecting corporate practice, whether it is
run for profit or is one of the non-profit cooperative group insurance
10. Volckening Inc., 13 T.C. 723 (1949).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 401(a) (4).
12. Id. at §401(a) (5).
13. See 6 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 2525 (1931).
14. 1 FLETcHER, CORPORATIONS § 97 (1931) ; Pearl v. West End Street Ry., 176
Mass. 177, 57 N.E. 339 (1900) ; Moore v. Lee, 109 Tex. 391, 271 S.W. 214 (1919).
15. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. App. 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938) ; People
v. United Medical Service Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
16. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992
(1935) ; Barton v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942) .
17. See Note, Right of Corporation to Practice Medicine, 48 YALE L.J. 346
(1938).
18. Rights of first refusal in the corporation and stockholders help solve the prob-
lem of delectus personae in the close corporation. See Cataldo, Stock Transfer Re-
strictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. REv. 229 (1951).
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variety.19 Three states have permitted incorporation on the theory that
the corporation was not practicing medicine but had contracted with
physicians for the latter to supply medical care to others." Statutes have
permitted group prepayment health corporations run on a non-profit basis
in many states1.2
Serious ethical objections to group practice have been repeatedly
raised by the American Medical Association.22 Recently, however, the
House of Delegates of the American Medical Association adopted, in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a resolution - which recognizes the propriety
of group practice probably in the corporate form as well as in unin-
corporated associations.2 4
It appears that the pension provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
already referred to, could be utilized in those states where corporate
practice is legal 25 provided all the stock thereof was owned by licensed
physicians.26
IV.
THE SECTION 7701 AsSOCIATION AS EMPLOYER.
The term "corporation" is defined as including an "association" in
Section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The latter term in-
19. Interman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938) ; Kendall v. Beiling,
295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943) ; McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d
139 (1937) ; People v. Carroll, 274 Mich. 451, 264 N.W. 861 (1936) ; Taber v. State
Board, 137 N.J.L. 392, 60 A.2d 290 (1948). The Bureau of Corporations of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not consider the practice of medicine a "proper
purpose" within the terms of the state's Business Corporation Law and therefore will
not issue a charter for such a purpose. Statement of Mr. Lee Swope, Director, Bureau
of Corporations, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, June 24, 1958.
20. State ax rel. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907); State
Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905); State
Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905); Doumitt v.
Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 P.2d 918 (1933).
21. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 159.1 (1954); N.J. REv STAT. §17:48A-1
(Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2851-1501 (Supp. 1957).
22. See extensive discussion in Laufer, Ethical And Legal Restrictions On Con-
tract And Corporate Practice Of Medicine, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 516 (1939).
23. The resolution reads as follows:
"Whereas, it has been found by experience that physicians practicing as a
partnership, association or as members of other lawful group arrangements can
preserve the physician-patient relationship, insuring that medical responsibility
lies in the hands of the patient's own doctor and not in the hands of an unlicensed
person or entity; and
"Whereas, the ethical principles of the A.M.A. apply to the individual physi-
cian whether he practices alone or with a group; now therefore be it
"Resolved, that the House of Delegates affirm that it is within the limits of
ethical propriety for physicians to join together as partnerships, associations or
other lawful groups provided that the ownership and management of the affairs
thereof remains in the hands of licensed physicians."
* 24. THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Special Edition,
March 1, 1958, p. 24.
25. At least Missouri, Nebraska and Oregon. See note 20 supra.
26. This requirement is necessitated by the ownership provision of the resolution
of the House of Delegates of the A.M.A., cited in note 23 supra.
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cludes any type of organization which is not, within the meaning of the
Code, a trust, estate or partnership. In Morrissey v. Commissioner,27 the
Supreme Court in holding a trust taxable as a corporation set out the
requisites of an association taxable as a corporation. These are: the
holding of title to property by the entity; centralized management; con-
tinuity of the organization uninterrupted by death among the owners;
transferability of interest without affecting the continuity of the enterprise;
and limitation of the personal liability of the participants. The regulations
under the 1939 Code 28 specify only three of the above features as sufficient
to cause a partnership to be taxable as a corporation, excluding as
requisites the holding title to property and the limitation of liability fea-
tures.29  Absence of limitation of liability has been held not to disqualify
a trust from being taxed as an association,8 the court looking to the
form which the enterprise most nearly resembled. The Pennsylvania
Limited Partnership has always been considered to be an association
under the regulationsA1 However, an organization formed under the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act was determined not to be an association
where liability was not limited as to all partners. 22 The fact that the
court felt that there was no continuity in the enterprise, although the
agreement permitted surviving partners to continue the business, was also
a deciding factor.
In United States v. Kintner,3 eight physicians who had practiced
medicine as a partnership in Montana formed an unincorporated associa-
tion as successor to the partnership. The association was controlled by
a board of directors representing all of the associates. The association
would continue if an associate died or withdrew, and title to the property
of the organization was held in the name of the association. Certificates
of ownership were issued to the associates. A pension plan was instituted
by the association, the contributions to which were claimed, in a refund
suit by Dr. Kintner, to be payments to a qualified trust and therefore
not currently income to him. The court held the entity to be an association
and thus taxable as a corporation, even though under the laws of Mon-
tana a corporation could not legally practice medicine.8 4 The court further
27. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
28. These regulations are still applicable by virtue of T.D. 6091, 1954-2 CuM.
BuLL. 47 which keeps in force those regulations not in conflict with the 1954 Code.
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1185, § 39.3797-4 (1953).
30. Bert v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
31. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.3797-6 (1953). See The Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 171 (Supp. 1957).
32. Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
33. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
34. The court in the Kintner case followed the case of Pelton v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936) in which it was held, as the Commissioner had urged,
that a trust established by a group of doctors was taxable as a corporation even
though the practice of medicine by a corporation was illegal under the law of Illinois,
the state in which the trust was established and operated.
COMM ENTS
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol3/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
found Dr. Kintner to be an employee of the association and the pension
trust a qualified plan " so that the contributions were not taxable to him
and were deductible by the association.
In the great number of states in which professionals may not legally
incorporate their practice the type of association chosen would be con-
sidered a partnership, trust, or whatever other form of unincorporated
association that is employed, rather than a corporation, because the or-
ganization has not complied with the requisites for incorporation under
state law. Thus, a form of organization legal under state law can be
utilized. Likewise, any such form employed would be considered ethical
for physicians in the light of the latest statement of the A. M. A. upon
the subject if ownership is limited to physicians.3 6 For federal income tax
purposes, however, the organization would be considered a corporation and
therefore would be capable of establishing a pension plan for its em-
ployee-stockholders subject, of course, to the limitations as to discrimina-
tion already discussed.3 7
No cases, other than Kintner, have been found directly upon the
subject. However, the Internal Revenue Service soon after that decision
issued a Revenue Ruling which held that:
"A group of doctors who adopt the form of an association in
order to obtain the benefits of corporate status for purposes of Section
401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is in substance a part-
nership for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. . . .The con-
trary position expressed in the case of United States v. Arthur R.
Kintner et ux., 216 Fed. 2nd 418, will not be accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service as a precedent in the disposition of other cases
involving similar fact situations." 38
In 'November of 1957, the Service modified its position upon this matter
in another Revenue Ruling" stating that the fact that an association
establishes a pension plan under Section 401(a) is not determinative of
whether such organization will be classified as a partnership or an
association taxable as a corporation, but that the usual tests will be applied
in determining whether a particular organization of doctors or other
professional groups has more of the criteria of a corporation than a
partnership. It also announced that a Revenue Ruling will be published
at a later date setting forth the basic criteria to be used in establishing
the existence of an association taxable as a corporation. At the time of
this writing the ruling has not yet been issued.
35. The plan qualified under Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 165(a), 53 STAT. 67, the
former version of and not relevantly different from the present § 401.
36. See note 23 supra, and related text.
37. See notes 7-12 supra, and related text.
38. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 392.
39. 1957 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 37.
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The availability to the physician of the association taxable as a
corporation as an effective means for the deferment of the taxation of
income appears uncertain at this time. In the light of the most recent
Internal Revenue Service pronouncement upon the subject,4 0 the use of
well-planned articles of an unincorporated association, such as was em-
ployed in the Kintner case, should result in corporation treatment. How-
ever it would seem that the most prudent course would be to await the
promised Revenue Ruling in order to have established criteria to be fol-
lowed for such treatment.
V.
CONCLUSION.
Because of the limited number of states in which the corporate form
is a legal vehicle for the practice of medicine, the corporation is generally
ineffective for the deferment of taxation of the physician's income by
means of the pension provisions of the Code. Legislative action in the
various states permitting incorporation for the practice of medicine, but
limiting stock ownership therein to physicians only, would appear the only
solution to this aspect of the problem. Ownership solely by physicians
would protect the public from commercial exploitation of the profession
while affording to physicians the advantages of the corporate form already
available to non-professionals.
A solution of the problem could come from either of two federal
sources. An amendment to the Code to permit professionals to establish
pension plans would afford the obvious solution. Perhaps just as effective
would be the recognition by the Internal Revenue Service of the Section
7701 association as the vehicle through which the physician may become
an employee for Section 401 purposes. The latter may already have been
effected 41 but a final solution awaits a more definitive ruling as to the
position of the Internal Revenue Service.
Burchard V. Martin.
40. Ibid.
41. See note 39 supra, and related text.
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